![]() ![]() The idea that the Soviet military was stronger than the French was simply unbelievable. Hitler ignored all arguments against itĪctually, Hitler assessed the pros and cons remarkably well. (A prime rationale for finishing the Russian threat was also to allow demobilising up to two thirds of the army, while simultaneously releasing more economic and manpower resources for high-technology naval and air combat should the British still prove stubborn.)Ģ. By knocking out the only other military power left in Europe, Hitler could build an invulnerable Fortress Europe. In fact Hitler accepted that his only chance of forcing Britain to peace was defeating their traditional tactic-used against Habsburg, Bourbon, Napoleon, Tsar (Crimea), Kaiser and Fuehrer-of subsidising a continental coalition. When Hitler turned his attention to the Soviet Union, many generals believed-yet again-that he was mad, this time for re-starting a two-front war. So Hitler won the military element again, though he was, again, to be disappointed by Britain’s refusal to make peace. The professional French troops the Germans lured into the Low Countries and cut off were among the best in the world, but the morale of the conscripts behind them collapsed like an undermined building, and the political leadership followed. Divisions in French society encouraged many French voters to say openly, “Better Hitler than Blum” (the French Socialist Party leader). ![]() Yet he was, again, correct about the political and social weaknesses of France. Hitler was declared mad, again, by many of his own generals for attacking France in 1940. Yet Hitler understood the political weaknesses of the Allied position, and rightly believed he had time to finish Poland. Hitler was declared mad by many of his own generals for attacking Poland in 1939, turning his back on the French, and starting a two-front war. There is an element of truth in most of these statements, as in most myths, but more that is vastly oversimplified, contradictory, or just plain wrong. Once they had survived the initial attack, the Soviet response would be overwhelming and inevitable. The Wehrmacht had vastly underestimated the opposition and never stood a chance.ġ0. The Wehrmacht had made no preparations for a winter campaign.ĩ. The Soviets were saved only by “General Winter”.Ĩ. ![]() ![]() The Soviets successfully traded space for time and were never in danger of total collapse.ħ. The attack was not compromised by the British intervention in the Balkans.Ħ. The attack only failed because of Hitler’s interference in the operations.ĥ. Stalin was mad to ignore evidence that it was coming.Ĥ. Hitler ignored all arguments against it.ģ. The popular mythology of Barbarossa is that it was a series of mistakes:Ģ. Most summaries available are highly confusing to read, with a number of apparently self-contradictory conclusions. Hundreds of books have been written on the subject, many with obvious biases-particularly those by pro-Soviet propagandists. This essay appeared in a recent Quadrant. By December the Russians could counter-attack, and the operation had failed. In October and November came a “last gasp” effort by exhausted and badly depleted Axis troops, who nonetheless came tantalisingly close to breaking Soviet resistance. In the “strategic confusion” of August and September Hitler-who had read far too much about Napoleon’s concentration on Moscow while failing to smash forces in the field-was constantly diverting armies from strategic objectives like Leningrad and Moscow to tactical operations all over the place. In June and July 1941 the Germans made stunning gains, destroyed tens of thousands of Soviet vehicles and planes, overwhelmed the dozen frontier armies in their path, captured many hundreds of thousands of prisoners, and took several vital objectives. Debates about Barbarossa stand in a class of their own for controversy and misunderstanding.īarbarossa actually had three phases. The cost of its initial successes, and eventual failure, was the most appalling casualty list ever recorded in a single operation. Its goal was the conquest, in a single season, of the largest area of territory to fall since the decades-long campaigns of the Mongol Khans. Nazi Germany launched an eventual 4.3 million Axis troops along an 1800-mile front in an attempt to smash the military potential and economic integrity of the world’s biggest federation, the USSR. Operation Barbarossa, June 22, 1941, was the greatest single offensive operation in the history of the world. ![]()
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